text-only page produced automatically by LIFT Text
Transcoder Skip all navigation and go to page contentSkip top navigation and go to directorate navigationSkip top navigation and go to page navigation
National Science Foundation HomeNational Science Foundation - Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences (SBE)
Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences
design element
SBE Home
About SBE
Funding Opportunities
Awards
News
Events
Discoveries
Publications
Advisory Committee
Career Opportunities
See Additional SBE Resources
View SBE Staff
SBE Organizations
SBE Office of Multidisciplinary Activities (SMA )
National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSE)
Division of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences (BCS )
Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES )
Proposals and Awards
Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide
  Introduction
Proposal Preparation and Submission
bullet Grant Proposal Guide
  bullet Grants.gov Application Guide
Award and Administration
bullet Award and Administration Guide
Award Conditions
Other Types of Proposals
Merit Review
NSF Outreach
Policy Office Website
Additional SBE Resources
Exploring What Makes Us Human
Rebuilding the Mosaic Report
Bringing People Into Focus: How Social, Behavioral & Economic Research Addresses National Challenges
"Youth Violence: What We Need to Know" Report to NSF
Social, Behavioral and Economic Research in the Federal Context Report
Expedited Review of Social and Behavioral Research Activities Report
SBE Advisory Committee Web Site (for members only)


SBE 2020: Submission Detail

ID Number: 107
Title: Market Design: Understanding markets well enough to fix them when theyre broken
Lead Author: Roth, Alvin E.
Abstract: In the past fifteen years, the emerging field of Market Design has solved important practical problems, and clarified both what we know and what we dont yet know about how markets work. The challenge is to understand complex markets well enough to fix them when theyre broken, and implement new markets and market-like mechanisms when needed. Among markets that economists have helped design are multi-unit auctions for complementary goods such as spectrum licenses; computerized clearinghouses such as the National Resident Matching Program, through which most American doctors get their first jobs; decentralized labor markets such as those for more advanced medical positions and for academic positions; school choice systems; and kidney exchange, which allows patients with incompatible living donors to exchange donor kidneys with other incompatible patient-donor pairs. These markets differ from markets for simple commodities, in which, once prices have been established, everyone can choose whatever they can afford. Most of these markets are matching markets, in which you cant just choose what you want, you also have to be chosen. One of the scientific challenges is to learn more about the workings of complex matching markets, such as labor markets for professionals, college admissions, and marriage.
PDF: Roth_Alvin_107.pdf

SBE 2020 Home

 

Print this page
Back to Top of page