Award Abstract # 1812522
SaTC: CORE: Small: verifying security for data non-interference

NSF Org: CNS
Division Of Computer and Network Systems
Awardee: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Initial Amendment Date: August 10, 2018
Latest Amendment Date: August 10, 2018
Award Number: 1812522
Award Instrument: Standard Grant
Program Manager: Phillip Regalia
pregalia@nsf.gov
 (703)292-2981
CNS
 Division Of Computer and Network Systems
CSE
 Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr
Start Date: September 1, 2018
End Date: August 31, 2022 (Estimated)
Total Intended Award Amount: $500,000.00
Total Awarded Amount to Date: $500,000.00
Funds Obligated to Date: FY 2018 = $500,000.00
History of Investigator:
  • Nickolai  Zeldovich (Principal Investigator)
    nickolai@csail.mit.edu
  • M. Frans  Kaashoek (Co-Principal Investigator)
  • Robert  Morris (Co-Principal Investigator)
  • Adam  Chlipala (Co-Principal Investigator)
Awardee Sponsored Research Office: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 MASSACHUSETTS AVE
CAMBRIDGE
MA  US  02139-4301
(617)253-1000
Sponsor Congressional District: 07
Primary Place of Performance: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MA  US  02139-4307
Primary Place of Performance
Congressional District:
07
Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): E2NYLCDML6V1
Parent UEI: E2NYLCDML6V1
NSF Program(s): Secure &Trustworthy Cyberspace
Primary Program Source: 040100 NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT
Program Reference Code(s): 025Z, 7434, 7923
Program Element Code(s): 8060
Award Agency Code: 4900
Fund Agency Code: 4900
Assistance Listing Number(s): 47.070

ABSTRACT

Many security problems today stem from bugs in software. Although there has been significant effort in reducing bugs through better testing, fuzzing, model checking, and so on, subtle bugs remain and continue to be exploited. This proposal explores the use of formal verification to prove security of a file system implementation along with an example application in the form of a mail server. Machine-checked verification is a powerful approach that can eliminate a large class of bugs in software by proving that an implementation meets a precise specification. As long as the specification rules out a certain class of bugs, the machine-checked proof will ensure no such bugs can exist in the implementation. This project develops techniques for proving security of sophisticated applications, such as proving that a mail server will not inappropriately disclose confidential email messages. At the high level, the impact of this work will be a more secure software infrastructure.

The key technical challenge that this project focuses on is data confidentiality. The project explores approaches for specifying confidentiality of systems software, including a mail server and a POSIX file system, as well as a framework for implementation and machine-checked verification of confidentiality properties for these applications. The project also develops common infrastructure that such applications depend on, including a formal security specification for a POSIX file system and verified implementations of a mail server and a file system with proofs of security, which will be useful to the broader community. Finally, part of the project involves developing course modules focused on machine-checked proofs of correctness and security for systems software.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH

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Ileri, Atalay and Chajed, Tej and Chlipala, Adam and Kaashoek, Frans and Zeldovich, Nickolai "Proving confidentiality in a file system using DISKSEC" Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI) , 2018 Citation Details
Athalye, Anish and Belay, Adam and Kaashoek, M. Frans and Morris, Robert and Zeldovich, Nickolai "Notary: a device for secure transaction approval" Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP 2019) , 2019 https://doi.org/10.1145/3341301.3359661 Citation Details

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