"Protecting Society from Bioterrorism: Scientists
and Their Societies to the Forefront"
Dr. Rita R. Colwell
Director
National Science Foundation
American Society for Microbiology 2002 Annual Meeting
May 21, 2002
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[Title slide: globe
and clock on microorganism collage]
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The theme of the panel --"scientists and their societies
to the forefront" -- resonates deeply for me, both
personally as a microbiologist and as director of
NSF, an agency that supports all facets of science
and engineering.
Fundamental research in all fields is one of our country's
pillars of strength and prosperity.
A hallmark of basic research is that results come from
unexpected places. NSF support contributes to the
wellspring from which research and development emerge.
I highlighted some examples from this wellspring during
my plenary address on Sunday.
To prevent a double-dose of information on NSF's role
in handling 9/11 events, I'll focus today primarily
on our role as a community of microbiologists. I appreciate
every opportunity to wear my microbiologist hat.
Way back when I joined ASM as a graduate student, Star
Trek completely monopolized sci-fi airwaves. William
Shatner and Leonard Nimoy were leading us "to boldly
go where no man has gone before." Now, for a "nominal
fee", any of us can actually book our own flights
into space.
I recall a series of events more specific to microbiology
that has unfolded almost parallel to my career.
Many of us know the landmark year of 1967 when the
World Heath Organization established the smallpox
eradication program. At that time, the disease was
still prevalent in 33 countries, with estimates of
10 to 15 million cases each year.
As a global community and with hubris, we celebrated
ten short years later--in 1977--when the last smallpox
patient was successfully treated. Our world was declared
smallpox-free in 1980. The success of the eradication
program was global, but fragile. The international
microbiology community played a pivotal role.
I was never a convert to the notion of eradication.
As a microbial ecologist, one has doubts about absolutes.
In any case, we now find ourselves facing a most troubling
paradox. Smallpox is a "number one" priority on the
list of potential biological weapons. (I guess Edward
Jenner would be disappointed at this turn of events.)
This situation symbolizes the obligation to outline
our new role as a community of microbiologists.
We must deal with the global problem of bioterrorism.
Our professional community and the fundamental scientific
research supported by NSF are critical.
To stimulate discussion on potential new roles for
our professional society, I'll close today with a
list of potential action items. These would assist
federal and state health agencies, our country's first
responders, and our nation's citizens in the event
of a bioterrorist attack or an infectious disease
outbreak.
[T.S. Elliot quote]
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But first, let's look back briefly in time. Throughout
history, we have used significant events as guideposts.
In American history, we speak of the Revolution, the
Civil War, Pearl Harbor, Sputnik, the Kennedy assassination,
the Moonwalk, and now, September 11.
With time much on our minds, I offer a framing premise
for my comments today. I borrowed this quote from
T.S. Elliot's Four Quartets. He wrote, "Time present
and time past / Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past."
I find much truth in those prophetic words describing
the interconnectedness of the past, present, and future.
The past holds the seeds of the future, and our future
is rooted in the past. Both influence the decisions
we make today.
In each time past, present, and future, in each are
lessons that will stimulate discussion on protecting
society from bioterrorism.
[Timeline of bioterrorism]
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In time past, valuable lessons portend significant
consequences for our present and future.
The impacts of infectious disease and bioterrorism
throughout history are not new information for us
here today. Bioterrorism existed centuries before
the discipline of microbiology. A timeline of examples
is interesting:
In the 6th Century, the Assyrians poisoned
the wells of their enemies. Later, the Tartar army
catapulted bodies of plague victims over the walls
of Kaffa (in what is today Ukraine).
A plague epidemic followed as mercenary forces retreated
from the city. Even then, humans understood the malignant
capacities of disease.
[Library of Congress
letter to Jeffrey Amherst, 1763]
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Closer to home, smallpox was intentionally spread to
Native Americans with contaminated blankets and handkerchiefs
during the French and Indian War.
Here we see an excerpt from an original letter kept
in the archives at the Library of Congress. Written
by Colonel Henry Bouquet to Lord Jeffrey Amherst,
it suggests the distribution of blankets to "inoculate
the Indians."
This 1763 letter reads, "I will try to inoculate the
Indians by means of blankets.taking care however not
to get the disease myself."
[Cholera cartoon]
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In reading about the first cholera epidemics--which
I do in my spare time--government officials in Paris,
France were quoted as saying,
"There is nothing to worry about. We are the
most civilized nation in the world. The epidemics
that are happening in other places will not
happen here."
In spite of this statement, in 1848, 8,000 Parisians
died of cholera.
In Paris at that time, literacy was so low that newspapers
were read only by an elite few. News spread by bulletins
and posters with updates of who and how many had died.
There was rumor, propaganda, and extreme anxiety--much
like what we witnessed during the recent anthrax cases.
We learned from that experience that epidemiology is
not just the science of an organism. It's also about
history and society. Personal, family, and community
experiences influence public response. History prevailed
during the recent anthrax mailings.
[George Santayana
quote]
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The words of George Santayana, well known philosopher
and poet are nearly biblical: "Those who cannot remember
the past are condemned to repeat it."
We are fortunate that within our professional society,
we have the experience, wisdom, and research know-how
to heed Santayana's warning. Microbiologists can help
guide society--by offering both historical context
and by providing a solid foundation of scientific
research. Both of these are critical in time present.
It is clear that there is a greater need for public
understanding of scientific knowledge. We have a responsibility
to convey to the public that science is neither inherently
good nor bad.
Over the centuries, microbiology has been a dual use
science. Today, as microbiologist we have new and
important societal responsibilities. We are a valuable
resource for enlightening domestic policy and international
collaboration.
Although one-third ASM members are from other nations,
we need to encourage young microbiologist to study
and conduct research abroad. This provides insight
into other cultures, pathogens, and predictive and
remedial tools. Close international cooperation not
only enriches the research but can serve to alert
us to malevolent microbial traffic.
And the expanding diversity of our own domestic workforce
is an opportunity to enlist more people of different
backgrounds and cultures into the field of microbiology.
With the world becoming more of a global community,
this must be a goal.
[Internet traffic
image]
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The scientific community is a global sharing institution,
with information readily available for those who need
it. Terrorist organizations can use this benign and
beneficial research for their own purposes.
The will and capability to use biological weapons is
increasing among terrorist groups and some states
that sponsor the research. In 1997, one analyst observed
"eleven countries are pursuing offensive-oriented
biological warfare programs, up from just four in
the 1960s."
The Internet and information technologies have drastically
improved the commerce factor for scientific advancement.
Here we see an illustration of global Internet traffic,
which depicts the free-flow of information.
This exchange has led to an accelerated pace of advancement
in most areas of research. However, it is also much
easier for a sinister-minded individual to usurp this
same information to inflict harm.
In addition, bioterrorism is more suited to terrorist
objectives than other weapons of mass destruction.
A single individual can manufacture a biological weapon
under relatively primitive conditions as opposed to
the large, sophisticated facilities and additional
personnel needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.
This means that knowledge itself has become the critical
commodity.
Our membership roster lists the experts, sometimes
the only individuals, who are capable of distinguishing
whether an individual is conducting beneficial microbiology
research or developing a biological weapon.
With the advent of biotechnology, only a scientist
examining activities in his or her area of expertise
would be capable of distinguishing between the two.
This makes us unique and powerful allies for the international
regulatory community.
[time future quote]
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We as a community should not be reticent. The federal
government has become proactive and has responded
with new investments in research and technologies
to prevent, remediate, and negate biological weapons.
ASM members have been taking roles to help prioritize
the research investments.
But as we all now understand, research is only one
component critical to the equation. How we organize
to prevent and respond to outbreaks is also important.
[Sobral quote excerpt
with American agriculture collage]
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We also know that in addition to human diseases, we
must consider indirect threats to our food and water
supplies. For instance, Al Qaeda evidently plotted
the landmarks and public water supplies of most major
American cities. This is not idle speculation.
Many countries considered epicenters of terrorist activity
have experimented extensively with agro-terrorism.
Iraq, for example, was developing wheat cover smut
as a weapon in the late 80s, most likely to use against
Iran.
In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate, Bruno Sobral,
Director of the Virginia Bioinformatics Institute
said,
"A single agricultural terrorist could launch a
pathogen that, spread by wind, water, or soil,
could cause an irremediable chain reaction.
The food supply and industries involved directly
in food production and distribution are especially
vulnerable.
A terrorist wishing to cause severe and reverberating
financial consequences could simply introduce
a foreign disease into American livestock or crops.
This would set off a chain reaction touching virtually
every segment of this nation's economy."
[foot and mouth disease
visual]
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The recent UK foot-and-mouth disease debacle is a case
in point. Nearly four million animals were slaughtered.
This comes as the UK cattle industry still reels from
the $6 billion lost due to the mad cow disease outbreak
in 1996.
We see here that only two areas have been safe from
foot-and-mouth disease over the last couple of years:
Australia and North America. A disease epidemic or
bioterrorist attack in our agricultural system introduces
another conundrum.
We must be cautious when deploying emergency personnel.
An attack in one sector might be used as a feint to
divert resources from critical command posts.
A major livestock disease outbreak in Texas would shift
our primary command and control emphasis there, as
well as large numbers of military personnel. We must
be prepared for such decoys that would leave other
key targets vulnerable.
[Anne Sexton quote]
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Lest we forget, the same basic science that helped
create biological weapons will also provide us with
antidotes to these scenarios.
Sensors offer a powerful and practical example of science's
dual use. These types of tools formally designed for
a single purpose can protect our nation, as well as
society in times of peace. From nanotechnology to
NEON, NSF-supported researchers are on the verge of
a comprehensive quick-warning system with many practical
uses.
The exchange of scientific information and its use
will always be a two-way street. We need no longer
ponder the chicken/egg conundrum. Perhaps poet Anne
Sexton captured it best when she said, "Even without
war, life is dangerous."
Science thrives on open discourse. We cannot limit
scientific interaction without limiting scientific
progress. Measures that inhibit dialogue will impede
advancement.
Scientific progress is imperative as our country is
ill-prepared to cope with an epidemic. This is the
case whether we must contend with a biological weapon,
an accidentally introduced exotic pathogen, or a naturally
mutated pathogen. We have little experience dealing
with epidemics of any proportion in this country.
[quote from microbial
report]
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Many diseases currently overwhelm our preventative
and therapeutic measures-HIV, Ebola, West Nile virus,
and malaria--just to name a few. Infectious disease
concerns are global in scope.
In today's world of rapid travel and large migrant
populations--infectious diseases, regardless of introduction
mode--pose a growing threat to our health, agriculture,
and economy.
However, nothing in the realm of a natural outbreak
could rival the complex response problems that would
follow a bioterrorism attack against a civilian population.
Such an attack represents a unique hybrid of a national
security crisis and a public health emergency.
Organizations and agencies involved in bioterrorism
response follow different cultural styles. Individuals
in leadership positions would not likely have worked
together before. Top officials will rely on the advice
of experts they have never met. And, they will also
be forced to make decisions about issues with which
they are largely unfamiliar.
[CDC trading cards]
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One of the most important roles we can play as microbiologists
is to fill the information void for decision makers
regarding the principles of infectious disease.
Community-wide response plans that incorporate the
latest scientific principles of microbiology are critical.
Mechanisms for experts to be tapped in the event of
an emergency are also essential.
In the words of Admiral Stansfield Turner, former CIA
Director, only bioweapons and nuclear weapons have
the potential to bring the United States "past the
point of non-recovery."
None of us would consider quoting Nikita Krushchev;
but, he warned us that, "After nuclear war, the living
would envy the dead."
In time future, the potency, diversity, and accessibility
of biological weapons will increase as biological
science advances and the number of trained biologists
rises. It is likely that Kruchchev's comment would
be just as applicable after a bioterrorist attack.
The future we will experience indeed lies in the past
and in our present.
Will it be written that we suffered greatly because
we were unprepared? Or, will the future be filled
with better health care and disease eradication because
we were prepared.
I'll close now by sharing a few immediate actions that
we can begin to discuss. I put them forward as sketched
ideas; I do not mean them as absolutes, but as a mechanism
to discuss and debate our most effective roles.
[list of potential
actions]
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1) The ASM could develop guides for diseases with pertinent
information, for example, symptomatology, whether
they are contagious, and what the first best emergency
action would be if you suspect it.
2) Locally, the ASM could design a format for workshops
that emergency personnel would take to become knowledgeable
with the most effective first actions in a bioterrorist
crisis. This would serve as a primer for every rescue
worker. Then, in an emergency they would all be on
the same page.
3) We should also assist in developing information
guides for public sanitation officials, i.e., precautions
for our food and water supplies.
4) We could provide guidelines and workshops to educate
the public. These could be made available in public
libraries, public schools, and also via video for
public TV and school assemblies.
5) We could also assist with an e-mail hotline for
questions from public officials. These questions could
be routed to appropriate experts, or they could rotate
through appropriate committees.
We hear much rhetoric or general talk about bioterrorism
concerns. Some practical suggestions that make use
of our unique expertise would be appropriate to discuss.
I look forward to your suggestions and comments.
It seems to me it is our "time" and our responsibility
to step up and step out!
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